Natural sciences |
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The natural sciences currently enjoy a great reputation within many knowledge communities. This is partly due to its relatively recent successes and achievements. The contribution of the natural sciences to knowledge is a whole is undoubtedly enormous. Discoveries in its field have helped us to understand better what drives us as human beings, how our planet has evolved and even what the universe may look like. But natural sciences were not always as highly regarded. There have been cases were scientific hypothesis were seen as ludicrous and even dangerous because they did not fit within the dominant way of thinking (cognitive paradigm). Science had to fit in with the world view of the time and not the other way around. Nowadays it seems that the tables have turned. Once upon a time, some scientific discoveries would have been rejected because it did not fit in with the paradigms of religious knowledge systems. Nowadays, some people reject religion because it does not fit in with the scientific way of thinking.
Western civilisation went through a major cognitive paradigm shift around the 17th Century. Discoveries by Galileo and Newton challenged the prevalent dominant discourse. A new theory of knowledge primarily based on empirical evidence and reason was created. Scientific evidence soon became synonymous with 'ultimate proof' and religious knowledge was challenged by scientific sceptics. This scientific revolution brought about major changes in the way we thought about the world, particularly in the West. Mankind arguably benefited in many ways from this cognitive paradigm shift and with an increased understanding of the world around us, living standards and education generally improved.
Nevertheless, one should not forget that sometimes even the greatest scientists can be wrong. What was considered scientific knowledge at some stage in history may currently be considered inaccurate. And as our scientific knowledge advances, we have to revise previous ideas. Our understanding of atoms and human DNA has evolved considerably over the last century, new elements have recently been added to the periodic table, and the list goes on and on. Last but not least, we should remember that some scientists have even become guilty of scams and hoaxes such as Piltdown hoax. The drive to come up with ground breaking scientific discoveries has led some researchers to tamper with data and evidence. The more recent case of Andrew Wakefield and the MMR vaccine (see lesson at the bottom of this page) also highlights the importance of peer review and the questioning of expert opinion in the field of the natural sciences.
A scientist tries to paint a picture of the natural world through the scientific method. This method is based on observation and hypothesis. After experimentation, scientists may formulate a law and ultimately a theory. A scientific law "predicts the results of certain initial conditions". In short, it predicts what will happen. A scientific theory, on the other hand, "provides the most logical explanation as to why things happen as they do". In short, it proposes why things happen. Sometimes scientific laws stand the test of time, whereas theories don't. Kepler's laws of planetary motions are still used today, for example, whereas his theory of musical harmony has now been replaced with gravity to explain why the planets move the way they do. It is expected that scientists can repeated experiments that should prove their knowledge claims in a range of controlled conditions.
We also actively try to prove each other wrong in the natural sciences through a process which is called 'falsification'. We continually revise and review what counts as scientific knowledge. This process is quite important in the context of theory of knowledge and it is a topic of study you many want to explore further. Scientific laws generally don't change much, unless new data or information becomes available. Scientific theories, however, may co-exist and be discarded at different points in time. Experts may disagree, even when they have access to what seems to be the same facts and data. What counts as the best possible explanation at one stage in history, may sound implausible at another point in time. As mentioned in the TED ed below "multiple scientific theories may compete to provide the best possible explanation of a new scientific discovery". So how do scientists decide which theory is the best? It is usually a theory that explains most data and a theory that can predict what was not observed yet before. For example, Mendeleev had predicted the existence of several undiscovered elements. A theory that is not backed up with much evidence from experiments and data is not usually regarded as very scientific. Theories like the big bang, climate change and evolution seem to have withstood the test of time and are generally accepted today.
We can find many historical examples of where the scientific world had actually accepted the wrong theory (eg the geocentric model), but it is hoped that scientific progress can be made by the continual testing and falsification of theories. This is what makes science different from a dogma. Interestingly, incorrect theories have their value and that they sometimes may give rise to the creation of new theories and scientific discoveries. Not all current scientific theories will be accepted in the future and it is perhaps a good thing that experts often disagree within a disciple. It is up to us as knowers, however, to analyse the acceptability of scientific knowledge claims and theories; to check under what circumstances we should or shouldn't accept expert opinion, keeping in mind the historical evolution of scientific theories.
Within the natural sciences we rely heavily on sense perception and reason. Advances in technology have allowed us to create better tools to observe, but they equally highlight that human beings remain to some extent 'ignorant knowers' due to the human limitations of sense perception. Reason, and particularly inductive reasoning, plays a major role within the scientific method. Inductive reasoning can lead to the creation of knew scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, with inductive reasoning comes the danger of hasty generalisations. Would it be possible or desirable to observe everything all the time to avoid the latter?
Lots of your scientific knowledge is in fact second hand knowledge you gained (at school) through language. Under which circumstances should we accept this second hand knowledge? Good science should actively invite peer-review and re-testing through experimentation. But is this always the case? What do you conclude when an experiment 'does not work'? What if scientists are not open to reviews? What should we believe if we are confronted with two seemingly opposing theories? And on what basis can we decide scientific studies were conducted correctly? Ben Goldacre points out how 'bad science' permeates popular culture and belief. Should we perhaps be wary of scientific knowledge claims (in media) which rely too much on emotive language (often fear)?
The knowledge frameworks make us question how the concepts and language we use influence the conclusions we reach. Scientific language feels more neutral or distant than the language we use in every day conversation. Cancer explained in scientific terminology (neoplasms, carcinoma, lymphoma, etc) is very different from the 'language' of Stromae's artistic interpretation. What is so scientific about science and its concepts? What are its strengths? And its limitations? Is scientific language neutral or reductionist? When we define love in scientific terms, we may ignore nuances which artists can grasp, for example. But do we really want doctors to communicate our medical conditions through emotionally loaded language or even poetry?
Moving from the field of the arts, which we traditionally associate with imagination, I would like to suggest that there may be more room for imagination in the natural sciences than we expect. It is argued that several historical scientific discoveries such as Kekule's notion of the benzene molecule were driven by scientists' imagination. Einstein is often quoted as an advocate of imagination, even though your maths or science teachers will not always encourage you to use more imagination within their lessons. Helen de Cruz and Johan de Smedt argue that (progress in) science is in fact a form of structured imagination, whereby analogies with knowledge in other fields (areas of knowledge) rather than a unstructured imagination (as in Kekule's dream) drive scientific discoveries. In fact, our intuitions about the natural world are often not very scientifc (for example, children across the world intuitively feel that earth is flat). But by transferring distant analogies, we can overcome these intuitions and make scientifc progess through what de Cruz and de Smedt call 'structured imagination'.
And what about faith? Is there room for faith in the natural sciences? Is there a point were we should stop? Do we simply cross the boundaries of what counts as natural sciences if we allow for too much faith, too much imagination, too much intuition?
The history of medicine as a discipline illustrates that there were times when the lines between science and pseudo-science were blurry. I would argue that with the increased quick dissemination of information through current media, pseudo-science has somewhat gained in popularity. We simply don't take the time to check our sources or the methodologies behind the latest discoveries before we share 'news' with someone else. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish between bad science (see Goldacre below) and pseudo-science as both 'sciences' resort to confirmation bias. Astrology is one of the more traditional examples of pseudo-science. It draws on confirmation bias (you count the hits and forget the misses). Its vague descriptions will ensure all 'believers' will be able to find examples to 'prove' the descriptions about their life events and personalities were right. Depending on the knowledge community you belong to, what is science to some, may be pseudo-science to someone else. Where would you place graphology, phrenology, acupuncture, homeopathy, Feng Shui, or brain gym?
The knowledge frameworks make us think about the object of study in our area of knowledge. The natural scientists' object of study is generally speaking the natural world. In this respect, it seems practical to apply the scientific method. It feels fairly plausible to expect a neutral observation, controlled conditions and the possibility of repeated experiments to test results objectively. But what about the study of human beings? Our human nature is partly biological. So are we suitable objects for (natural) scientific study? Can we explain how our body works in scientific terms? Is illness purely biological? What about mental illness? Where do natural sciences stop and human sciences begin? Human beings are difficult and complex objects of study. The mere acts of observation can change the observed. This is true to a lesser extent when we study inanimate objects of the natural world, but it becomes more acute when we study human beings. Human as well as natural scientists have to find ways around this to keep experiments as objective as possible. What are the differences and similarities between the methodologies of both types of scientists? How does the methodology affect the outcome? A good example is how we can explain emotion through the two different areas of knowledge.
In TOK we look at the difference between natural sciences, human sciences and pseudo-science. We also make links between natural sciences and other areas of knowledge. We evaluate the role of the ways of knowing in the natural sciences as well.
Finally, it is important to remember that despite the obvious strengths of the natural sciences as an area in which we create knowledge, it may not answer all of life's questions. Are we at risk of reducing the world through our love of the natural science? Is there room for a a holistic approach towards knowledge in a world so heavily influenced by the scientific method? Or does science have the ability to give us knowledge about more than just the natural world: our origins, what is right or wrong, or even God?
Western civilisation went through a major cognitive paradigm shift around the 17th Century. Discoveries by Galileo and Newton challenged the prevalent dominant discourse. A new theory of knowledge primarily based on empirical evidence and reason was created. Scientific evidence soon became synonymous with 'ultimate proof' and religious knowledge was challenged by scientific sceptics. This scientific revolution brought about major changes in the way we thought about the world, particularly in the West. Mankind arguably benefited in many ways from this cognitive paradigm shift and with an increased understanding of the world around us, living standards and education generally improved.
Nevertheless, one should not forget that sometimes even the greatest scientists can be wrong. What was considered scientific knowledge at some stage in history may currently be considered inaccurate. And as our scientific knowledge advances, we have to revise previous ideas. Our understanding of atoms and human DNA has evolved considerably over the last century, new elements have recently been added to the periodic table, and the list goes on and on. Last but not least, we should remember that some scientists have even become guilty of scams and hoaxes such as Piltdown hoax. The drive to come up with ground breaking scientific discoveries has led some researchers to tamper with data and evidence. The more recent case of Andrew Wakefield and the MMR vaccine (see lesson at the bottom of this page) also highlights the importance of peer review and the questioning of expert opinion in the field of the natural sciences.
A scientist tries to paint a picture of the natural world through the scientific method. This method is based on observation and hypothesis. After experimentation, scientists may formulate a law and ultimately a theory. A scientific law "predicts the results of certain initial conditions". In short, it predicts what will happen. A scientific theory, on the other hand, "provides the most logical explanation as to why things happen as they do". In short, it proposes why things happen. Sometimes scientific laws stand the test of time, whereas theories don't. Kepler's laws of planetary motions are still used today, for example, whereas his theory of musical harmony has now been replaced with gravity to explain why the planets move the way they do. It is expected that scientists can repeated experiments that should prove their knowledge claims in a range of controlled conditions.
We also actively try to prove each other wrong in the natural sciences through a process which is called 'falsification'. We continually revise and review what counts as scientific knowledge. This process is quite important in the context of theory of knowledge and it is a topic of study you many want to explore further. Scientific laws generally don't change much, unless new data or information becomes available. Scientific theories, however, may co-exist and be discarded at different points in time. Experts may disagree, even when they have access to what seems to be the same facts and data. What counts as the best possible explanation at one stage in history, may sound implausible at another point in time. As mentioned in the TED ed below "multiple scientific theories may compete to provide the best possible explanation of a new scientific discovery". So how do scientists decide which theory is the best? It is usually a theory that explains most data and a theory that can predict what was not observed yet before. For example, Mendeleev had predicted the existence of several undiscovered elements. A theory that is not backed up with much evidence from experiments and data is not usually regarded as very scientific. Theories like the big bang, climate change and evolution seem to have withstood the test of time and are generally accepted today.
We can find many historical examples of where the scientific world had actually accepted the wrong theory (eg the geocentric model), but it is hoped that scientific progress can be made by the continual testing and falsification of theories. This is what makes science different from a dogma. Interestingly, incorrect theories have their value and that they sometimes may give rise to the creation of new theories and scientific discoveries. Not all current scientific theories will be accepted in the future and it is perhaps a good thing that experts often disagree within a disciple. It is up to us as knowers, however, to analyse the acceptability of scientific knowledge claims and theories; to check under what circumstances we should or shouldn't accept expert opinion, keeping in mind the historical evolution of scientific theories.
Within the natural sciences we rely heavily on sense perception and reason. Advances in technology have allowed us to create better tools to observe, but they equally highlight that human beings remain to some extent 'ignorant knowers' due to the human limitations of sense perception. Reason, and particularly inductive reasoning, plays a major role within the scientific method. Inductive reasoning can lead to the creation of knew scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, with inductive reasoning comes the danger of hasty generalisations. Would it be possible or desirable to observe everything all the time to avoid the latter?
Lots of your scientific knowledge is in fact second hand knowledge you gained (at school) through language. Under which circumstances should we accept this second hand knowledge? Good science should actively invite peer-review and re-testing through experimentation. But is this always the case? What do you conclude when an experiment 'does not work'? What if scientists are not open to reviews? What should we believe if we are confronted with two seemingly opposing theories? And on what basis can we decide scientific studies were conducted correctly? Ben Goldacre points out how 'bad science' permeates popular culture and belief. Should we perhaps be wary of scientific knowledge claims (in media) which rely too much on emotive language (often fear)?
The knowledge frameworks make us question how the concepts and language we use influence the conclusions we reach. Scientific language feels more neutral or distant than the language we use in every day conversation. Cancer explained in scientific terminology (neoplasms, carcinoma, lymphoma, etc) is very different from the 'language' of Stromae's artistic interpretation. What is so scientific about science and its concepts? What are its strengths? And its limitations? Is scientific language neutral or reductionist? When we define love in scientific terms, we may ignore nuances which artists can grasp, for example. But do we really want doctors to communicate our medical conditions through emotionally loaded language or even poetry?
Moving from the field of the arts, which we traditionally associate with imagination, I would like to suggest that there may be more room for imagination in the natural sciences than we expect. It is argued that several historical scientific discoveries such as Kekule's notion of the benzene molecule were driven by scientists' imagination. Einstein is often quoted as an advocate of imagination, even though your maths or science teachers will not always encourage you to use more imagination within their lessons. Helen de Cruz and Johan de Smedt argue that (progress in) science is in fact a form of structured imagination, whereby analogies with knowledge in other fields (areas of knowledge) rather than a unstructured imagination (as in Kekule's dream) drive scientific discoveries. In fact, our intuitions about the natural world are often not very scientifc (for example, children across the world intuitively feel that earth is flat). But by transferring distant analogies, we can overcome these intuitions and make scientifc progess through what de Cruz and de Smedt call 'structured imagination'.
And what about faith? Is there room for faith in the natural sciences? Is there a point were we should stop? Do we simply cross the boundaries of what counts as natural sciences if we allow for too much faith, too much imagination, too much intuition?
The history of medicine as a discipline illustrates that there were times when the lines between science and pseudo-science were blurry. I would argue that with the increased quick dissemination of information through current media, pseudo-science has somewhat gained in popularity. We simply don't take the time to check our sources or the methodologies behind the latest discoveries before we share 'news' with someone else. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish between bad science (see Goldacre below) and pseudo-science as both 'sciences' resort to confirmation bias. Astrology is one of the more traditional examples of pseudo-science. It draws on confirmation bias (you count the hits and forget the misses). Its vague descriptions will ensure all 'believers' will be able to find examples to 'prove' the descriptions about their life events and personalities were right. Depending on the knowledge community you belong to, what is science to some, may be pseudo-science to someone else. Where would you place graphology, phrenology, acupuncture, homeopathy, Feng Shui, or brain gym?
The knowledge frameworks make us think about the object of study in our area of knowledge. The natural scientists' object of study is generally speaking the natural world. In this respect, it seems practical to apply the scientific method. It feels fairly plausible to expect a neutral observation, controlled conditions and the possibility of repeated experiments to test results objectively. But what about the study of human beings? Our human nature is partly biological. So are we suitable objects for (natural) scientific study? Can we explain how our body works in scientific terms? Is illness purely biological? What about mental illness? Where do natural sciences stop and human sciences begin? Human beings are difficult and complex objects of study. The mere acts of observation can change the observed. This is true to a lesser extent when we study inanimate objects of the natural world, but it becomes more acute when we study human beings. Human as well as natural scientists have to find ways around this to keep experiments as objective as possible. What are the differences and similarities between the methodologies of both types of scientists? How does the methodology affect the outcome? A good example is how we can explain emotion through the two different areas of knowledge.
In TOK we look at the difference between natural sciences, human sciences and pseudo-science. We also make links between natural sciences and other areas of knowledge. We evaluate the role of the ways of knowing in the natural sciences as well.
Finally, it is important to remember that despite the obvious strengths of the natural sciences as an area in which we create knowledge, it may not answer all of life's questions. Are we at risk of reducing the world through our love of the natural science? Is there room for a a holistic approach towards knowledge in a world so heavily influenced by the scientific method? Or does science have the ability to give us knowledge about more than just the natural world: our origins, what is right or wrong, or even God?
How do we acquire knowledge in the natural sciences?
1. The scientific ‘method’
400 years ago, Galileo set up an experiment to test the hypothesis that objects accelerate when they fall. Experimentation was commonly employed by the Arabs, but their methods were looked down on by the Europeans, who followed the Church’s dictum that conclusions could only be reached by discussions and logic, following Aristotle.
Galileo’s reliance on empirical knowledge led Europe into the Enlightenment, and established the scientific method, which is still regarded as the only satisfactory approach when it comes to the acquisition of knowledge about the natural world.
The stages of the scientific method. Watch this clip, and write a short description of each of the following stages of the scientific method.
Science should, therefore, provide an explanation based on impartial research backed by rigorous checks and balances, and not belief. False scientific evidence should never get past stage 4, let alone become a theory.
2. Serendipity in science
Serendipity is a very peculiar English word, with a very specific meaning. It is a very useful when applied to discoveries in science that have been made ‘by chance’, although as Louis Pasteur said, ‘Chance favours the prepared mind.’ The best way to understand the role of chance is to focus on specific cases, and below there is a list of examples from which you can find these. Do they support Pasteur’s assertion?
3. The role of induction and falsification
We have seen that the scientific method involves formulating a hypothesis. There are many ways in which a scientist may arrive at their hypothesis (including serendipity), but probably the most common one is observationalist-inductionism – that is, observing that a phenomenon has always occurred that way in the past, and inducing that it will always happen that way in the future. Proving this hypothesis to be true will be the aim of their experimentation during the testing stage.
To put this in context, let’s say that I am the first scientist to notice that water always boils at the same temperature, 100˚C. Using induction, I suggest the hypothesis that water always boils at 100˚C. I then set out to test this hypothesis, and boil water over a period of years, and always arriving at the same conclusion. I submit my findings to a respected journal, my peers check my findings, and my hypothesis is published. No one refutes my idea, and my hypothesis duly becomes a theory. Over time, the theory then becomes a law.
But there is a problem with this way of viewing science. We cannot prove anything with 100% certainty in the natural world, so the purpose of science is not to show that things are true, rather that things are false. If a hypothesis stands up to testing over a long period of time, it is given the term theory. This means that we are not so much interested in theories that are true as we are theories that are not false.
This idea provides us with a convenient definition of a scientific hypothesis: a statement that can be (potentially) falsified. If it is not (potentially) falsifiable, then it isn’t scientific, and belongs to some other field. In the example given above, if I say that water boils at 100˚C, this is clearly scientific, as it can be proven false (or true) in an experiment. If I say that the earth was created by God, this clearly isn’t a scientific theory, because there is no way of testing this idea, and proving it to be false (or true).
The scientist/philosopher who advocated this idea was Karl Popper. In the 1960s he challenged what was then the accepted view that science worked along observationalist-inductionist lines – or, reaching conclusions about hypotheses on the basis of previous results, rather than the potential falsifiability of the idea. According to Popper, nothing that cannot be falsified can be called a scientific hypothesis/theory.
Some people have criticised Popper’s ideas, as it is difficult to show that some theories are false – for example, evolution. Indeed, Popper said of this:
Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research program.
However, the idea of falsification being an integral part of a scientific theory is a very useful way of testing the validity of most scientific hypotheses, and separating the ones that have little claim to scientific legitimacy.
4. Are scientists always objective?
The scientific method is designed to be flawless system, protecting us not only from ‘bad science’, but also allowing ‘good science’ to emerge and flourish. How well it does this is open to interpretation. To form an opinion on this, read through this article on the climate change e-mail scandal.
Concluding questions
Dunn, Michael. How do we acquire knowledge in the natural sciences? (10th May 2013). theoryofknowledge.net. http://www.theoryofknowledge.net/areas-of-knowledge/the-natural-sciences/how-do-we-acquire-knowledge-in-the-natural-sciences/ Last accessed: 14th February 2017
400 years ago, Galileo set up an experiment to test the hypothesis that objects accelerate when they fall. Experimentation was commonly employed by the Arabs, but their methods were looked down on by the Europeans, who followed the Church’s dictum that conclusions could only be reached by discussions and logic, following Aristotle.
Galileo’s reliance on empirical knowledge led Europe into the Enlightenment, and established the scientific method, which is still regarded as the only satisfactory approach when it comes to the acquisition of knowledge about the natural world.
The stages of the scientific method. Watch this clip, and write a short description of each of the following stages of the scientific method.
- The problem
- Hypothesis
- Prediction
- Testing
- Peer review
- Publication
- Replication or falsification
- Theory
- Corrections and modifications
- Laws
Science should, therefore, provide an explanation based on impartial research backed by rigorous checks and balances, and not belief. False scientific evidence should never get past stage 4, let alone become a theory.
2. Serendipity in science
Serendipity is a very peculiar English word, with a very specific meaning. It is a very useful when applied to discoveries in science that have been made ‘by chance’, although as Louis Pasteur said, ‘Chance favours the prepared mind.’ The best way to understand the role of chance is to focus on specific cases, and below there is a list of examples from which you can find these. Do they support Pasteur’s assertion?
- Penicillin
- The pacemaker
- Radiation
- Safety glass
- Teflon
- Saccharine
- LSD
- Rayon
- Uranus
- X-Rays
3. The role of induction and falsification
We have seen that the scientific method involves formulating a hypothesis. There are many ways in which a scientist may arrive at their hypothesis (including serendipity), but probably the most common one is observationalist-inductionism – that is, observing that a phenomenon has always occurred that way in the past, and inducing that it will always happen that way in the future. Proving this hypothesis to be true will be the aim of their experimentation during the testing stage.
To put this in context, let’s say that I am the first scientist to notice that water always boils at the same temperature, 100˚C. Using induction, I suggest the hypothesis that water always boils at 100˚C. I then set out to test this hypothesis, and boil water over a period of years, and always arriving at the same conclusion. I submit my findings to a respected journal, my peers check my findings, and my hypothesis is published. No one refutes my idea, and my hypothesis duly becomes a theory. Over time, the theory then becomes a law.
But there is a problem with this way of viewing science. We cannot prove anything with 100% certainty in the natural world, so the purpose of science is not to show that things are true, rather that things are false. If a hypothesis stands up to testing over a long period of time, it is given the term theory. This means that we are not so much interested in theories that are true as we are theories that are not false.
This idea provides us with a convenient definition of a scientific hypothesis: a statement that can be (potentially) falsified. If it is not (potentially) falsifiable, then it isn’t scientific, and belongs to some other field. In the example given above, if I say that water boils at 100˚C, this is clearly scientific, as it can be proven false (or true) in an experiment. If I say that the earth was created by God, this clearly isn’t a scientific theory, because there is no way of testing this idea, and proving it to be false (or true).
The scientist/philosopher who advocated this idea was Karl Popper. In the 1960s he challenged what was then the accepted view that science worked along observationalist-inductionist lines – or, reaching conclusions about hypotheses on the basis of previous results, rather than the potential falsifiability of the idea. According to Popper, nothing that cannot be falsified can be called a scientific hypothesis/theory.
Some people have criticised Popper’s ideas, as it is difficult to show that some theories are false – for example, evolution. Indeed, Popper said of this:
Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research program.
However, the idea of falsification being an integral part of a scientific theory is a very useful way of testing the validity of most scientific hypotheses, and separating the ones that have little claim to scientific legitimacy.
4. Are scientists always objective?
The scientific method is designed to be flawless system, protecting us not only from ‘bad science’, but also allowing ‘good science’ to emerge and flourish. How well it does this is open to interpretation. To form an opinion on this, read through this article on the climate change e-mail scandal.
- What does the article say about the peer review system?
- Why does the article say that there are ‘cracks in the system’?
- What is the University of East Anglia’s CRU and who heads it?
- What allegations have been made against him?
- If these allegations are true, what does it suggest about the scientific method?
- Research another scientific scandal, explaining what occurred, why, and the results.
- Do you think that scientists have any special ethical obligations that other professionals don’t have? If so, what are they, and why?
Concluding questions
- Which element of our acquisition of knowledge in the natural sciences do you think is the most important? Why?
- How important is the role of reason in the process of knowledge acquisition in the natural sciences?
- Is the scientific method flawless?
Dunn, Michael. How do we acquire knowledge in the natural sciences? (10th May 2013). theoryofknowledge.net. http://www.theoryofknowledge.net/areas-of-knowledge/the-natural-sciences/how-do-we-acquire-knowledge-in-the-natural-sciences/ Last accessed: 14th February 2017
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337598772-nicholas-alchin-on-the-scientific-method.docx |
What is so scientific about science? Goldacre on bad science
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Scientific Claims: An African Perspective
Context
Certain knowledge claims are reliably supported by scientific activity. On the other hand, certain traditional beliefs are justified in a less rigorous manner, although there are similarities in the ways in which each claim might have come into existence: repeated observation, generalization, inspired ideas, or prediction and explanation.
Given these similarities between the origin of scientific claims and these other traditional beliefs, how do we know what counts as science?
Aim
To investigate what constitutes a scientific knowledge claim and whether such claims can be differentiated from other sorts of claims.
Focus Activity
Which of the following can be regarded as scientific claims?
1. During the first seven days after birth, it is dangerous to expose a child to the outdoors or to strangers.
2. When a man and a woman both have sickle-cell anaemia, it is dangerous for them to have children.
3. Singing while bathing is dangerous.
4. Bringing bundles of firewood from the farm into the village is dangerous.
5. Smoking cigarettes is dangerous.
6. Cutting a tree in the forest without performing certain rites is dangerous.
7. Fishing on Tuesdays is dangerous.
8. A live, non-insulated electric wire is dangerous to touch.
9. Pounding fufu after dark is dangerous.
10. Driving after drinking alcohol is dangerous.
Discussion Questions
Certain knowledge claims are reliably supported by scientific activity. On the other hand, certain traditional beliefs are justified in a less rigorous manner, although there are similarities in the ways in which each claim might have come into existence: repeated observation, generalization, inspired ideas, or prediction and explanation.
Given these similarities between the origin of scientific claims and these other traditional beliefs, how do we know what counts as science?
- By the subject matter?
- By the nature of the explanation? By the theory or law involved?
- By the proofs?
- Or just by belief?
Aim
To investigate what constitutes a scientific knowledge claim and whether such claims can be differentiated from other sorts of claims.
Focus Activity
Which of the following can be regarded as scientific claims?
1. During the first seven days after birth, it is dangerous to expose a child to the outdoors or to strangers.
2. When a man and a woman both have sickle-cell anaemia, it is dangerous for them to have children.
3. Singing while bathing is dangerous.
4. Bringing bundles of firewood from the farm into the village is dangerous.
5. Smoking cigarettes is dangerous.
6. Cutting a tree in the forest without performing certain rites is dangerous.
7. Fishing on Tuesdays is dangerous.
8. A live, non-insulated electric wire is dangerous to touch.
9. Pounding fufu after dark is dangerous.
10. Driving after drinking alcohol is dangerous.
Discussion Questions
- Consider each of the claims given. Suggest how each of them could have come into existence. In each case, what sorts of thinking processes and types of reasoning might have been involved? Observation, generalization, application of generalizations, inspiration…
- Compare your answers for the different claims. Are there aspects of the thinking processes involved which are common to most or all of them? If so, what are they?
- Is it possible to construct very different, but equally believable, routes by which these claims could come into existence? Compare different claims here. What problems are there in suggesting their possible origins?
- Which of the claims do you regard as being scientific? Justify your answers. Do you have a single criterion for distinguishing the scientific from the non-scientific? Or is it necessary to use several criteria? Has the distinction more to do with method or content or result, or something else?
- If a claim works in everyday life, is there any need for further explanation? Does it matter what kind of explanation is provided
- To what extent is each of us as an individual justified in believing each of these claims?
- Why do non-scientific beliefs persist in groups of people familiar with scientific explanation?
- Explanations for taboos are often given in supernatural terms. Is it possible to reconcile natural and supernatural explanations?
- If science and taboos are both about laws, then how, if at all, do these types of laws differ?
- Is this attempt to rationalize beliefs always justified? Are there beliefs which arose in quite non-rational ways? If so, how?
links between NATURAL SCIENCES AND OTHER areas of knowledge:
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